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The Frankenpaper
One or More Essays on Writing
and Frankenstein and Deleuze and . . .
Joshua Cruz & Holly Corkill
This work is a rhizome, a burrow. The castle has multiple entrances whose rules
of usage and whose locations aren’t very well known.
—Deleuze & Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature

We believe that this quotation situates our paper well; this paper emerges
from an email sent from the second author to the first, containing the world “Frankenproposal.” Her use of that portmanteau, a combining of “Frankenstein” and
“proposal,” provided a fruitful avenue to begin a conversation about the writing
process. What are the Franken- qualities of writing, and what are the limits of
the Franken- analogy? What exactly is the nature of a Franken(stein)? What is
the nature of any creative endeavor? Our conversation became too much to contain; our thoughts meandered. They began to overlap and beget new ideas. The
word “Frankenproposal” was an intersection of everything that had been said/
thought/written about Frankenstein and everything that had been said/thought/
written about (de)composition. The word “Frankenproposal” itself is a Frankenmonster, a coming together of parts to form a creature that cannot be contained
within a single directed conversation; it takes on a life of its own. This paper is
the result of our conversational spill-over and a rhizomatic intersecting of ideas.
Like Macaully’s (1990) children’s book, Black and White, these pages may contain a number of short independent essays: a literary analysis, an author’s writing
biography, thoughts on writing theory; or it may be only one essay. Like Deleuze
Joshua Cruz is an assistant professor and Holly Corkill is a Ph.D. candidate,both
in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction of the College of Education at
Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas. Email addresses: joshua.cruz@ttu.edu
& holly.corkill@ttu.edu
© 2020 by Caddo Gap Press.
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and Guattari’s (1986) castle, it has many potential entrances. We leave our readers
to discover points of dis/junction among the various ideas that have spilled onto
these pages (if they want to), the result of two individual multiplicities engaged in
a dialogue about Frankenstein… or writing… or Shelley… or Deleuze… or some
or all of these topics, or even more than these.
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The Frankenstein Monster:
Anti-Oedipus, Body without
Organs, a Phenomenon of
Bordering
“… the strange nature of
the animal would elude all
pursuit…”		
—Mary Shelley, Frankenstein

“What is the Body Without
Organs of a Book?”
Bringing the Post to Post-Process Composing
The post-process movement
in composition studies adopts
the term “post-” literally:
process no longer explains how
writing works, so we move
somewhere else. Post- in this
sense is “after” (Kent, 1999;
Trimbur, 1994). This version of
post- does not necessarily leave
process entirely behind, but it
moves the concept of process
beyond the cogito

Is the Author’s Work Her Own?:
Intensities, Assemblages,
and anti-Agency
in Shelley’s
Frankenstein

Holly’s Writing Reflection
As horror writer Stephen
King once said (appending
on to a quote once written by
William Faulkner), “…kill your
darlings, kill your darlings, even
when it breaks your egocentric
little scribbler’s heart, kill
your darlings” (King, 2000,
p.222). The implications of this
metaphor are simultaneously
macabre and grossly accurate.
Writing is an act of creation, and
the manifestation of that creation
is a product that
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Consider the Frankenstein
monster: it is the anti-Oedipus.
Indeed, it has no mother to
Oedipus about, and we cannot
say that it was born in any
kind of Freudian sexual frenzy.
Rather, it wasn’t, and then one
day, it was. While the common
portrayal of the Frankenstein
monster’s beginnings involve
a body on a slab, scientific
machinery, and harnessing the
power of lightening, Shelley’s
description of the monster’s
“birth” is far less detailed: the
narrator simply states that one

When Mary Shelley added
an introduction to the 1831
publication of Frankenstein,
she called this insertion
“an appendage to a former
production” that she promised
to limit to “such topics as have
connection to [her] authorship
alone” (Shelley, 2017, p.
291). The use of the word
“appendage” is apt considering
that the text to which Shelley
adds this explanation to a body
of writing that documents the
aftereffects of one man’s efforts
to create life through the

et scribo approach of
cognitivism that had dominated
writing in the 80s; it suggests
that matters of context and
audience are paramount in
writing and that there can be no
one series of steps that produces
“good” writing.
But post- as a philosophical
enterprise implies more than a
simple social turn, which seems
to be what the post-process
movement ultimately boils
down to (Breuch, 2002). Breuch
notes that when applied to a
discipline, post- has the potential
to decenter the human

many refer to as a body of
writing. In the same way that,
at the moment of birth, a child’s
body exits the mother’s womb
and is suddenly present in a
place where, only moments
before there was merely the
idea of a child, an author brings
forth a body of writing…a child
that, for better or worse, enters
the world either as a divine
creation or as a monster (maybe
both). Though it is uncertain
as to whether or not all writers
experience this sensation, many
writers perceive their work…this
brainchild they have
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rainy night in November, he
saw the accomplishment of his
toils brought about by collecting
“the instruments of life” around
him. There is no description
of these instruments. As such,
popular media has taken the
Frankenstein creation in any
number of directions: most are
familiar with James Whales’
1931 Frankenstein, for instance
(“It’s alive!”), and there is the
more elaborate Kenneth Branagh
representation of the birth of the
monster, wherein Frankenstein
creates what is

cobbling together of a body…
an assemblage of parts sutured
together to make a whole. In the
appending of the introduction to
the 1831 edition of Frankenstein,
Shelley insists that she only
did so in an effort to satisfy her
publishers’ concerns that the
body of work as it previously
existed in the 1818 publication
of the work was not whole;
however, this explanation
reinforces the idea that the novel
Frankenstein is an assemblage;
moreover, from a Deleuzian
standpoint, we can use

(e.g. Barnett, 2015; Rickert, 2013);
provide attention to infinitely
complex minutiae (Mays,
2017; Lynch & Rivers, 2015);
and express incredulity with
metanarratives of what writing is
or should be. However, Breuch
claims, post-process theory has
yet to do this. Similarly, Heard
(2008) asks what we should do
with the post-process movement
in writing. He observes that there
was something called a postprocess movement, writing and
composition theorists nodded their
heads in acknowledgement, and

imprisoned in the page to be
monstrous from its inception.
Thoughts of the work’s
ineptitude and ignorance plague
the writer. “This paper can’t
possibly be good enough…
everyone who reads this will
hate it…please do not read my
stuff because you’ll think badly
of me once you see just how
wretched, basic, and grotesque
my writing skills are.” The writer
finishes the writing, and, for a
brief moment comes the feeling
of relief at completion, but this
moment can be fleeting.
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essentially an artificial womb.
Harnessing the power of electric
eels, Victor plunges probes
into the body of his creature
(the astute observer will not
overlook the sexual implications
of probing a body with rods or
the phallic imagery of writhing
eels in a yonic pool of liquid).
Shortly thereafter, Robert De
Nero is expelled in a deluge of
amniotic fluid. This tells us that,
at least in film representation, we
cannot move beyond the idea of
an Oedipal birth. There exists a
fixation on pinning down

Shelley as a kind of case study
to examine how authorial
agency is, in fact, non-existent
when speaking about the writing
of a text. To understand any
assemblage, one must embrace
the multiplicities that exists
within and around it as well
as the intensities that inform
it. Deleuze and Guattari posit
that “a book has only itself,
in connection with other
assemblages and in relation to
other bodies without organs”
(p. 4). Frankenstein, therefore,
has itself in connection with
Shelley, the

then nothing happened. As
late as 2017, Newcomb and
Leshowitz observe that writing
studies has become “stuck” in
a space between process and
post-process, unable to fully
move into the realm of postprocess. It seems that postprocess, as a compositional
movement, never had a chance
to blossom to full potential, as
it has been both undertheorized
and underutilized. Barnett
(2015) claims that composition,
as a field, is only just beginning
to think of the place that
nonhuman actors occupy

How relatable this passage from
Frankenstein: “I had desired it
with an ardour that far exceeded
moderation; but now that I had
finished, the beauty of the dream
vanished, and breathless horror
and disgust filled my heart.”
Upon beholding the finished
body of work, the writer feels
the exhilaration of “I really
did it! I finished,” but this is
followed by, “Oh God—what
have I done?”
If the body of writing
manages to make it past this
initial rejection by its creator,
then
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the monster with human origins and rationality, even while
Victor attempted to create a
post-human species (Carretero-Gonzalez, 2016). We provide
the monster with a beginning
that we can wrap our collective
heads around, if not ex-(faux)
utero, then at least with the
vivacity provided by a lightning
strike on a marble or metal slab.
And why not this neurotic fixation on the Oedipal? We have
come to believe that “Oedipus
is an easy subject to deal with,
something perfectly obvious, a
‘given’ that is

assemblages that constructed
her, and the assemblages that
she constructed, a recursive
relationship of monstrous
generation wherein Shelley
becomes the vessel, rather than
the author, of her magnum
opus. Shelley, we feel, offers
a particularly interesting case
given the nature and topic of
her writing, and we believe that
the assembly of a monster, one
driven by intensities of passion
and grief, offers a metatextual
reading of Shelley’s process.

in the discipline; Lynch and
Rivers’ (2015) work, which
houses Barnett’s, is an homage to
complexity, to “extend invitations
and assemble collectives” (p. 14)
around composition. In this spirit,
we explore the works of Deleuze
(1990) and Guattari (1983; 1986;
1987), thinking about what it
might mean to post- process
within the field of composition
studies.
Writing was one of many
topics discussed by Deleuze
and Guattari, but it held a
special importance for them,
given their heavy

revision occurs. The author
strikes the delete key or the
eraser like the wielding of the
axe, hacking away sentences,
paragraphs, and pages like
they were gangrenous limbs.
Perhaps, along with this act
of amputating superfluous
prose, the author appends, or
transplants works from another
piece into the body of work,
cannibalizing one no longer
viable monstrosity to give life to
another.
For the second author, this
idea of cannibalizing one piece
in the effort to create
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there from the very beginning”
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p.
26).
This the monster is not: not
an easy subject, not obvious, not
a given (not even a thing with
a beginning). Thus, we create
a neat narrative where Shelley
provided none; as we confront
the alien, the philosopher,
or the monster, we “pinch it,
probe it, and in the end dissect
it. Laboriously, bit by bit…
cobble together an identity for
it” (Massumi, 2002, p. 233). We
attempt to provide an “Oedipal

Frankenstein is assembled
through Shelley and, in turn,
it assembles her own life.
Traumatic experiences shaped
Shelley’s life from birth. Eleven
days after giving birth, her
mother, Mary Wollstonecraft,
died of a postpartum infection
that left Shelley in the care of
her William Godwin. Mellor
(1988) indicates that, despite
his biological relationship to his
infant daughter, Godwin, who
was a prominent British literary
figure in his own right, preferred
Mary Wollstonecraft’s

reliance on examples from
literature and the fact that
writing is intimately connected
to some of their theoretical
developments, such as the
rhizome and schizoanalysis.
Additionally, within the first
pages of A Thousand Plateaus
(1983), they ask us to consider
“what is the body without
organs [BwO] of a book” (p.
4). And perhaps, whatever the
answer might be, offers us one
entry point into the question
of what it might mean to postwriting studies. There is, of
course, no one answer to this

another was how the concept
of the “Frankenproposal”
came to be. In an effort to put
together a research proposal,
she turned to the boneyard
of her hard drive, looking
for the written equivalent to
“bones from charnel houses…
profane fingers…tremendous
secrets of the human frame”
so that she might use them
again (Shelley, 1818, p. 55).
In the end, she found two
suitable corpses among piles of
discarded writing. They existed
because, at one point, they had
satisfactorily fulfilled the
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organization” (Deleuze and
Guattari, 1983, p.123) for that
which we do not understand,
and as such, an “interminable
proliferation” of psychoanalytic
readings (Rieder, 2003, para.
4) appear for the Frankenstein
monster. Though Massumi is
speaking about the outsider in
general, his language evokes
the same scientific lab present
in various Frankenstein films
wherein Victor does his work,
providing a scientific rationale
for the monster’s being.
However, Massumi criticizes
this scientifizing

illegitimate first daughter Fanny
Imlay. This emotional distance
between Mary Shelley and
her father only worsened after
Godwin married Mary Jane
Clairmont in order to establish
the financial security that his
liberal ideals and lifestyle
had deprived him of for many
years. Clairmont and Mary did
not have an easy relationship
(Mellor, 1988), so the theme
of parental absenteeism and
rejection emerged for her at
a young age. Mary Shelley’s
decision to leave home to elope
with Romantic poet Percy

question, but as we consider
what a body without organs
is, as well as what a book is
and the elements that go into
making a book (i.e., writing), we
hope to touch upon one of the
multiplicities that might compose
a more serious post-process
movement in composition.
What we see across
Deleuze (1990) and Deleuze
and Guattari’s (1983; 1987)
work is that they attempt
to dismantle individuations
between content, writing,
author, and reader, beginning
with the idea that “there is no

requirements of one deadline
or another, but, even at the
time they had gone out into the
world, the second author had
known that they were deformed
and that she would have to rip
them apart and mend them back
together again. Products of
early journeys into qualitative
research, they had been
finished with a knowledge that
something in them was flawed
and monstrous. They could have
very easily been completely
discarded into the bone pile had
the author not been willing to
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as a kind of “running in place,”
a “limited and limiting view” (p.
233) of the world.
Despite media
representations, the Frankenstein
monster is too free to be bogged
down by this kind of Oedipal
organization or scientifizing;
its intrigue is its inability to be
pinned, despite our attempts
to do so, from vague birth to
equally vague end, appearing
here and there throughout the
novel of Frankenstein, emerging
unexpectedly at the top of a
mountain and, shortly thereafter,
among

Shelley would place further
strain on the relationship
between father and daughter
(Brackett, 2016). Along with
this lack of parental affection,
she experienced turmoil
throughout her relationship
with Percy Shelley due to his
desire to engage in a libertine
lifestyle of sexual dalliances
with Mary Shelley’s half-sister
Claire Clairmont (Brackett,
2016). In addition to these
constant tensions, Mary
gave birth to and lost shortly
thereafter a premature daughter
named Clara in

difference between what a book
talks about and how it is made”
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 4).
Here, the line between process
and content are obliviated. As
one writes, the content drives the
creation of the writing, and vice
versa—writing creates content.
But Deleuze and Guattari
complicate writing further,
stating that “there is no longer
a tripartite division between a
field of reality (the world) and a
field of representation (the book)
and a field of subjectivity (the
author)” (p. 23). They seek to

acknowledge that, though the
overall quality of the writings
were something “permeated by
unformed, unstable matters”
(Deleuze and Guatarri, 1988,
p. 4), the author recognized
viability within parts of each
draft and grafted the meat of
each of these papers into the
new body.
Odd that, even now, as this
paper takes form, the same
exploratory procedure of
drafting is occurring. A previous
draft written months ago gets
pored over with surgical
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the icy wastes of the near-north
pole, existing always “at the
borderline of the village, or
between villages” (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987, p. 246), haunting
the fringes. It is ubiquitous and
ever-hidden. Its actions are
conflicted and contradictory,
forging friendships on one
page, murdering the next.
Indeed, contemporary reviews
of Frankenstein treated
the monster with equal
amounts of fascination and
discomfort, stemming from his
indeterminate and independent
nature. Walter Scott (1818),

1815. Following the birth of the
Shelleys’ son William in 1816
(he would die in 1819), Percy
and Mary Shelley had come
to reside in Geneva alongside
Lord Byron. At this point in
Mary Shelley’s life, following
this accumulation of traumatic
experiences, she would
make the wager and have the
nightmare that would inspire
the creation of Frankenstein.
Or, as Deleuze and Guttari
might put it, her dream was
“externalized, by a

obliviate the line that separates
author from the book as well.
The material that one writes
about, the writing itself, and the
one who writes—these exist
as a singularity, penetrating
and penetrated by one another.
Writing, they state, exists as an
assemblage with the external
world, not as a representation of
it, but a junction with it. A book
is of the world as much as it is
of an author, and the author is of
the world and of the book: not a
tripartite division,

precision. There are quotations
and paragraphs within even this
draft that had life before, but
the organism they were a part of
was monstrous in some way, so
the author has cleaved the words
from the bones of a previous
draft. They are their own
assemblage, part of the old draft
and now part of the new. Should
revision of this draft occur (and
it probably will), they may or
may not continue to be a part of
the next assemblage.
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for instance, seemed confused
by the monster’s freedom,
stating that we should “be
disposed … to question whether
the monster… could have
perpetrated so much mischief
undiscovered, or passed through
so many countries without being
secured… (Scott, 1818, n.p.).
How in the world, he seems
to be saying, does it manage
so well, despite the structures
and strictures that we might
place on it? On the other hand,
an anonymous review from
The Edinburgh Magazine and
Literary Miscellany appreciated

system of relays and plug-ins,
extrinsic linkages” (p. 356).
By 1816, we are able
to see the various mechanic
assemblages that would produce
intensities that could then
externalize as Frankenstein:
rejection, trauma, loss, grief
producing machines. Attach to
this grief machine a hideous
figure within a nightmare…a
figure whose “success would
terrify the artist” (Shelley, 2017,
p. 299), Shelley began to give a
voice to the nightmare

but a tripartite constituting of
among all three of these entities.
And yet another entity
factors into this writing
assemblage: the reader of a
piece of writing. Deleuze (1990)
and Guattari (1983) encourages
the reader to approach writing
as a schizophrenic, not as one
who attempts to derive a precise
meaning from the words present
in a piece of writing, but as one
who attempts to decompose
those words into syllables and
phonemes. What is left is not an

The origins of the paper do
not just come from the fusing
together of new words and
words of previous drafts. There
are multiple roots spreading
across the writing. There is the
author, yet there are also all of
the things that are both beyond
and within the author. The first
author and the second author
are simultaneously writing
separately, yet one has an
influence on the other. Equally,
the experiences and influences of
each author are at play as well.
They are themselves, yet the
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the juxtaposition of the
monster’s appearance and
(usually) kind nature, lauded
his ability to fit into both the
Gothic-Romantic sublime and
pastoral setting. The reviewer
states simply that “we even
like a story the better that it is
disjointed and irregular;” the
writing style, the monster’s
action, and the physical
description of the monster
itself contribute to a disjointed
irregularity.
The Frankenstein monster
manifests as a “phenomenon of
bordering” (Deleuze and

a voice that was, both hers
and the monster. Deleuze and
Guattari (1980) state that,
“Each of us is caught up in an
assemblage…we reproduce
its statements when we think
we are speaking in our own
name; or rather we speak in our
own name when we produce
its statement” (p. 6). Though
Victor, the monster, and Walton
would speak each in their own
names, their statements were
also Shelley’s statements.
Content, author, and process

effect of language but a “pure
language affect” (Deleuze,
1990, p. 88) that plays upon
and within the schizophrenic
readers. For “reading a text is
never a scholarly exercise in
search of what is signified, still
less a highly textual exercise in
search of a signifier” (Deueluze
& Guattari, 1983, p. 106). It
is a surface-level, neurotic
reading wherein words signify
a particular meaning, being
expressible and denotable,
and it is this surface that the
schizophrenic reader is able to
see beyond: “as

sum of everything that has
brought them to this place. each
other. Within the lines of this
paper, the first author’s Capoeira
instructor and the second
author’s Shakespeare professor
shout over one another through
the lines of prose, each voice
competing for the territory of
lines on the page until they
reach a place where they can
speak in concert with one
another.
In a series of letters between
Deleueze and Guattari about
the nature of original thought,
Delueze (1977) writes,
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Guattari, 1987, p. 245),
not quite human, not quite
animal: an anomaly “which
is outside the rules [and]
goes against the rules” and
an an-omalie, “the cutting
edge of deterritorialization”
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987,
p. 244). Everything about the
monster suggests a bordering
phenomenon. It crosses the
border between life and death,
political, microbial, and
anatomical borders—its body is
a collective of sewn parts, an arm
bordering a shoulder bordering a
head: “bones from charnel
there is no surface, the inside
and the outside, the container
and the contained, have no
precise limit. They plunge into a
universal depth” (p. 87). Within
this depth, melding occurs.
Words become utterances that
create a space between author
and reader wherein affect and
intensity of language (sounds)
manifest.
What then does reading
a text do? For Deleuze and
Guattari (1983) reading is “a
productive use of the literary
machine, a

collapse into a singularity,
manifesting as a book.
Could we ever say that
the author was alone with
her nightmares and affects?
Wolynn’s (2016) discusses the
effects of trauma as they work
upon genetics. These negative
valences that wrote across
Shelley’s body, Wolynn claims,
can pass through generations
in much the same way that one
might physical features from
parents. Trauma did not begin
with Shelley. She represents a

I would imagine myself
approaching an author
from behind, and making
him a child, who would
indeed be his, and would,
nonetheless be monstrous.
That the child would be his
was very important because
the author had to say, in
effect, everything I made
him say. But that the child
should be monstrous was
also a requisite because it
was necessary to go through
all kinds of decenterings,
slidings, splittings
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houses,” other parts collected
from “the dissecting room
and slaughter house,” brought
together not in a lab but a
“workshop” (Shelley, 1818, p.
55), which implies that unlike
in Whale’s or Branagh’s media
adaptations, the construction
of the monster is not a
scientific endeavor so much
as a mechanic assembling of
body parts over parts over
parts. While this anatomical
bordering is true of every body,
the description of the monster as
“uncouth and distorted” (p. 271)
draws attention to the very

rhizomatic opening into the
grief machine as we examine
the map of grief through which
various members of Shelley’s
lineage had passed: traumas of
parental loss, grief, violence, or
rejection. They appear again in
children, undergoing mutations
that manifest as depressive
affective states (Wolynn, 2016).
Though born without the
memory of the trauma, a child
comes into the world with the
parents’ trauma, nonetheless.
What better example of a
productive mechanic

montage of desiring-machines, a
schizoid exercise that
extracts from the text its
revolutionary force” (p. 106).
We have already seen the
various parts that compose
this machine: the author, the
text, the reader, and context(s)
surrounding author, reader, and
text, all assembled in a recursive
intermingling; but what is the
revolutionary force of a text?
Deleuze and Guattari (1986)
claim that the literary machine
is a relay for “revolutionary
machine-to-come,”

secret discharges, which
have given me much
pleasure (p. 112-113).
This idea of making an author
who, in turn makes a monster,
is the very essence of what
it means to teach writing.
Writers are not just writing
as themselves; they are also
writing as their teachers. The
neuroses of writing is never
one’s own—write in the
margins…don’t use “I” …don’t
use “you”…the body of an
essay is five paragraphs…don’t
use contractions in academic
writing—these are not simply
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physical bordering that
occurs from part to part. To
“Frankenstein” something is to
cobble together from various
components, to overlap the
boundaries of one object, to take
the cut-up and to reassemble
it into an exercise of border
crossing. The monster’s
existence rails against political,
vivacious, and bodily territories.
It is a living embodiment of
Burroughs’s cut-up, a method
designed to de- and reterritorialize (Moore, 2007), to
upset and redefine boundaries;
in doing so, it does indeed, as

assemblage? Couplings produce
grief, but they also produce a
child, an assemblage in its own
right, coupled to a grief engine.
Wolynn posits that one of the
reasons that this epigenetic
trauma becomes possible is
because before we are even
thought of, we are already part
of our parents: our grandmother
carries us as she carries our
mother since there is a point in
our mother’s fetal development
where her body produces her
own finitude of eggs. Chemical
changes occurring in our
father’s body and,

(p. 18). During this process,
the author disappears from
view, creating a “collective
enunciation,” an enunciation
of thought that has been (and
will continue to be) acted
upon by all. We might call this
enunciation “kairotic” (Rickert,
2013), a coming together of
time and location that spills over
into writing through a writer.
But there is no individual,
autonomous expression of
thought in writing, and the
writing is not the writer’s own.
Instead, it is to be taken up by
other; indeed, the author

organic instincts a writer is born
knowing. One cannot enact
good or bad writing without
another first teaching someone
how to enact it. Writers are the
sum of themselves, but also
their teachers; writing teachers
know this. They fear the idea of
their students going forth and
producing monstrous writing as
much as they fear their own bad
writing.
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Walter Scott observed, “elude
all pursuit” (Shelley, 1818, p.
85) making itself imperceptible
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987).
We cannot see the spark of life
that is given to the monster,
despite Branagh’s or Whale’s
attempts; we cannot see the
monster as it crosses from
country to country if it wishes
to remain hidden; we cannot see
the body of the monster as homo
sapiens (Carretero-Gonzalez,
2016)—only as an assemblage
of overlapping parts.

impacting his mental health,
become a part of the child’s at
the time of conception. These
affects are networked along
various lines; we do not carry
our mother and father’s trauma
within us. We carry the trauma
of our maternal and paternal
grandparents, their parents,
and so on, infinitely. Is the
trauma really ours? Is fear of
fire mine, or does it belong to
the compositional forces that
brought “me” about? We are
an assemblage not just of our
mother’s physical features, but
also of the neuroses

becomes a “foreigner to
one’s own tongue” (Deleuze
& Guattari, 1987, p. 388),
subsumed and ultimately
disappearing from the writing
altogether. Joyce writes that
his “head is full of pebbles and
rubbish and broken matches
and bits of glass picked up most
everywhere” (Joyce, 1921).
His head is permeated by this
collection of foreign objects
which spill onto his pages. The
schizoid reader takes up the text,
and once penetrated by printed
words, engages in the act of
“conjuring up the affect, and of

Josh’s Writing Reflection
I think of all of the writing
that I have done in the past;
it pales to the writing that my
colleagues have produced,
and I know it pales to the
writing that I will produce
in the distant future. All that
I have written and all that I
will write: are they separate
instances, each isolated from
one another? Conventional
wisdom in academia is to create
a narrative of your research.
Your work should speak to a
particular interest, all housed
within one neat
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And while the parts overlap,
they also decompose. When
Frankenstein first beholds
his creation, he describes the
creature as having “yellow skin”
that “scarcely covered the work
of muscles and arteries beneath”
(Shelley, 1818, p. 58). The
monster’s body cannot contain
the organs; the muscles and
arteries burst forth from beneath
the monster’s skin making the
body “permeated by unformed,
unstable matters” (Deleuze and
Guattari, 1987, p. 4). We have,
then, a physical body without

psychoses, and traumas,
always at play with one
another, influencing and
inscribeing themselves into our
compositional makeup.
And these affects, these
intensities that might be
inscribed within Shelley spill
over, onto paper. Shelley’s first
experience of trauma, the loss
of her mother, is one that is
spoken by multiple characters
throughout Frankenstein—or,
rather, it is the experience of her
characters as much as it is her
own. Consider the monster, for
example. In the same

transforming the painful passion
of the body into a triumphant
action” (p. 88). A text is not
written so much as it writes; it
inscribes itself upon the reader.
This is the “revolutionary force”
that the schizoid extracts from
text: a changing of affect and
disposition, a deterritorialization
of stability, a call to action
within the reader, whatever that
action may be.
And now we may begin
to think about what the body
without organs of a book might
be. First, it is important to think
about use of

story about who you are as a
researcher: “I am a qualitative
researcher; see how my work is
all qualitative? I am interested
in writing. See how all of these
pieces of writing are about
writing?” While I balk at the
necessity of this (why should we
be pigeonholed?), I wonder if
it is possible to escape. Derrida
(1981) talks about the preface—
anything is a preface to anything
else. When one reads the end to
a novel, it is the preface to the
beginning of the novel were we
to read it again, as we will
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organs, a body that seems
to be refusing the organs
inside of it. The body without
organs as described by
Deleuze and Guattari is at
least partially physical: it is
“matter that occupies space to
a given degree: to the degree
corresponding to the degree of
intensities produced” (p. 153),
as well as something “produced,
at a certain place and a certain
time in the connective synthesis,
as the identity of producing and
the product” (1983, p. 8). It is
brought out spatially when it is
called into

way that the monster suddenly
becomes present in the story, the
product of a vague process of
assembly that readers are never
a party to. He, rather, is birthed
from Mary Shelley’s mind; we
might imagine Athena emerging
from the head of Zeus. Or
perhaps he, an intensity of grief,
tears through her head in the
way that a child tears from the
vagina. Many of her characters
are without mothers: Victor
loses his natural mother at a
young age. Elizabeth first loses
her natural parents and

the word “of,” as this word
forces us to consider the
indeterminacy of language.
It is impossible to tell what
exactly “of” signifies. On the
one hand, it refers to the body
without organs that composes
the book, as in “a book made
of paper.” In this case, the
book simply is a body without
organs. Alternatively, the body
without organs is composed by
the book, in the phrase “of the
land.” It comes from, is created
by. Likely, it is both. The body
without organs is the blank slate
upon and through which

begin to anticipate the expected
ending. Or, the end of a novel
prefaces the beginning of
another piece of work entirely.
The end to one novel primes our
affective states, and colors the
rest of anything we might read
after it. A reading colonizes our
minds, inscribing it indelibly
across, prefacing anything we
might read afterward.
Why should this not be the
case for writing? Can it be that
writing is also the preface to
anything else I will ever write?
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space by the intensities that
inhabit it, however it is also the
metaphysical body that refuses
to let one intensity dominate. For
the capitalist, the body without
organs is capital (1983), for the
masochist it is implements of
pleasure-torture, for the drug
user it is a becoming cold; it is
a way of being for each body
(1987). As these intensities
write themselves across the
body without organs, it becomes
extended into a spatial body,
that of the capitalist, etc. But the
body without organs prevents a
neurotic tie to

then her adopted mother.
Also, on his letter to his sister,
Walton indicates that he grew
up under his sister’s “gentle and
feminine fosterage” and that his
father died when he was young
(Shelley, 1818, p. 9), which
suggests that Walton has also
grown up without a mother.
Along with a lack of consistent
natural maternal influences or
affection in the story, the one
statement Mary Shelley makes
regarding the presence of a
mother figure mirrors her own
relationship with Mary Jane

intensities pass, the point of
0 intensity itself (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987). Imagine a
hyper-permeable cell with no
organelles. The organelles are
all outside of the cell. But that
hpyerpermeability would allow
those organelles to enter and
leave as time passed. Perhaps
only mitochondria passes
through at one point—then
it is a cell of mitochondria,
an energy cell. The
mitochondria is briefly joined
by chloroplasts. It is then an
energy producing cell and a
photosynthetic cell. When the

Nearly a decade ago, I wrote
my first publication. It was a
socio-cognitive piece on identity
and writing. We might see how
that is the preface to a piece
like the one I am currently
writing—concerned about
issues of writing, about (non)
identity, about constructing and
assembling sentences. But it is
also the preface to anything I
have written, whether the topic
is writing or not, identity or not,
assembling or not. Traces of
the ideas of that paper (and any
paper I have written) exist
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these intensities or desires, acting as a barrier to desire-production (1983; 1987): a blank canvas, a place itself of 0 intensity.
It is not intensity itself, but the
space through which intensities
are able to unfold, and as each
being is a multiplicity, the intensity of desiring-production is
able to erase and re-write itself
across the body without organs.
A capitalist body becomes the
masochist body becomes the
drug using body and so on.

Clairmont. Though Justine
Moritz does have a mother,
the relationship is strained.
According to Victor, “This girl
had always been the favourite of
her father, but through a strange
perversity, her mother could
not endure her, and after the
death of M. Moritz, treated her
very ill” (Shelley, 1818, p. 68).
Mary Shelley’s addition of this
record of constant mistreatment
of Justine at the hands of
Madame Moritz then becomes
the author’s expression of the
trauma inflicted upon her by

mitochondria leave, then it
becomes a photosynthesizing
cell, until other organelles
pass through and inscribe their
actions into this hypothetical
cell without organelles, much
like Joyce’s head.
Within a schizoid reader,
text becomes a howling that is
“welded together in breath…
like the bones in the blood of the
body without organs” (Deleuze,
1990, p. 89). The schizophrenic
reader is a body without organs
acted upon by the text, which
itself is a locus of

in those papers that I currently
write or ever will write,
whether they are subtle or
overt, apparent or lurking in the
background. There is always a
narrative, even if that narrative
does not show progress, even if
that narrative is disjointed and
irregular, even if that narrative
is difficult to thematize.
Perhaps this idea of a
perfect narrative also has its
roots in this enlightenment value
of perfection, which is easy to
understand, to recognize, to
pigeonhole. This researcher has
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Just so, the Frankenstein
monster operates in this
bordering between the physical
and the point of 0 intensity.
The monster is a body without
organs, in the most literal and
figurative uses of the term—a
neutral pile of dead flesh, acting
as a physically manifest 0 point
of intensity upon which the mad
doctor may inscribe his toils and
obsessions. But, just as the body
without organs rejects a stable
production of desire (Deleuze
& Guattari, 1983), the monster
rejects being the Pygmalion

an indifferent stepmother.
This is not an instance of an
author writing from experience.
Rather, it may be understood
as an experience taking over
an author: there is grief in this
instance, one that manifests
as the absent mother (which
certainly was within the author’s
realm of experience) but the
grief penetrates bloodlines.
The grieving machine attaches
to Shelley: the Shelley-grief
assemblage produces a text.

intensities that has been
inscribed by a nameless author,
that inscribes itself upon the
reader, breathing a life of new
affect into the schizoid reader.
As I sit, writing these words, a
friend beside me plays a video
game; currently, she is fighting
a monster called a siren, an
ethereal spirit-creature which
has the ability to reanimate dead
bodies and call them to arms.
The bodies have been wounded,
gutted; they too are without
heads, entrails, limbs, and a
force deterritorializes them as
corpses, making

no ties to any other being
and, by Kant’s standards, is
“free.” But when we think
about the predictability that
must accompany this writing
in the academy, or as a result
of a demanding audience or
genre concerns, how far can
we actually say that the one
writing is free? When we must
pretend that the writing was
neat, tidy, that it began at point
A and ended at point B with no
meandering thoughts seeping
in, we are putting on a show.
When we claim that there is an
untroubled
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sculpture of Victor’s desire—
Victor must rewrite various
intensities across his monstrous
body without organs, filling it
at different times with disgustdesiring, hate-desiring, and
revenge-desiring. The monster
sloughs off his role as a
physical body without organs
for Victor and engages in the
act of inscription upon its own
body without organs. Within
the monster, the two planes
of 0 intensity come together:
the monster as Victor’s own
body without organs physically
manifest, and the

Shelley becomes a vessel
for traumatic intensities; it is
not she that speaks through
her book, but those intensities
that are written upon her via
the contexts from which she
emerges. Along with her lack of
being nurtured was her inability
to nurture—specifically, the loss
of her first child. The motherless
child fails to nurture her own.
If we understand grief as an
intensity that can inscribe itself
across generations, that lurks
and looms in its own monstrous
capacity, then

them new. As I watch this
occurring on the screen, I think
about the siren as a piece of text,
creating a revolution within these
bodies, initially lifeless, points of
0 intensity, ready to be inscribed
by the intensity of the siren.
The thought within a text, state
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) “is
like the vampire” (p. 377) and
we know that a vampire infects
(p. 242). The words in a text do
not tell, but they spread, creating
armies of revolting bodies of
action and affect. Vampires,
sirens, undead bodies

writing process, we do
disservice to those learning
to write, making them think
that they are bad writers when
not every piece falls into
place (Lamott, 1994); such
perfectionism kills creativity.
We attempt to hide or smooth
out the sutures that hold our
writing together, but in doing so,
we are being honest with neither
our readers nor ourselves.
Such suturing, I believe,
gets at the real nature of
Frankenwriting. Each individual
piece of writing is assembled of
various pieces
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monster as desiring agent acting
upon/with his own body without
organs. We see such inscription
as the monster realizes he
has been abandoned by the
De Laceys. He experiences a
“luxury of sensation” (Shelley,
1818, p. 162) that initially
he cannot endure. He allows
himself “to be borne away by
the stream” (p. 165) of hatred
as his body without organs “sets
up a counterflow of amorphous,
undifferentiated fluid” (Deleuze
& Guattari, 1983, p. 9) that
fuels his hate- and destructiondesiring. The

perhaps it was too much for the
child to bear; grief transmutes
itself from mother to child and
left Shelley unable to carry her
first child to term. We might say
that Mary Shelley’s portrayal of
the failed first meeting between
father and child in Frankenstein
was her way of processing her
trauma and disappointment at
Percy Shelley’s rejection of their
own child, a premature girl who
died shortly after her birth in
1815 (Badalamenti, 2006). We
might just as soon say that this
rejection also became

without organs, Artaud’s
Jabberwocky monster (Deleuze,
1990): writing is an exercise in
creating textual monsters and
(re)animating bodies.
Monsters, it seems, always
emerge from darkness or mist—
some space of indeterminacy.
Within these spaces, there
is always potential. They
exemplify what Deleuze
referred to as a virtual space
(Wallin, 2010). Reality may be
constituted and arranged in a
number of ways, and Deleuze’s
challenge to us

of writing external to it, whether
these pieces actually take
textual shape or not. A piece of
writing has every potential to be
something different than what it
is: an idea may be expressed in
a different way, a sentence may
connect to another sentence with
a semicolon rather than a period,
or on a larger scale, a different
topic may be approached in a
similar fashion, or in the case of
an academic paper, a different
theory may be chosen to situate
a piece of information. These
are all tools at our

Joshua Cruz & Holly Corkill

157

body without organs rejects
the reason of language, rejects
interrupting thoughts and
“utters only gasps and cries
that are sheer unarticulated
blocks of sound” (p. 9). It is
“the reversion of thought and
perception-action into pure
sensation” (Massumi, 2002,
p. 109), of which the monster
allows himself to experience
a luxury. We see the monster,
a body without organs and an
actor upon/with a body without
organs, operating in this state
of aphasiac, fluid, intense
sensation:

a part of Mary Shelley’s body
without organs, passing through
her arm, her hand, her pen, and
into the text of Frankenstein.
As Victor regards his efforts, he
goes so far as to call the monster
an “abortive creation” (Shelley,
1818, p. 38). Victor’s rejection
of his creature may be seen as a
kairotic moment (Rickert, 2013)
a manifestation of all aspects of
the malformed, miscarried and
misgendered body that Mary
had conceived and carried for
seven months—

is an “ethical impetus against
the world in advance” (Wallin,
p. 27). Writing is not a given;
if writing is a monster, then the
author is the obscuring mist
from which the writing must
meander out of. The form the
writing takes, however, should
be unknown until it emerges; no
method, no process, no stable or
transcendental structure should
tell us what that writing will
look like.
And just as Victor
Frankenstein gives us no clue as
to the method used to reanimate
his

disposal, used to assemble a
piece of text. If enough of the
parts are different, then we can
assemble a different paper. Or
we might go through with some
of these parts and revise what
we have written, cutting away
here, adding there, placing
certain items in our respective
shit-I-cut folders for later use.
Every paper, themselves all
Frankenthings, constitute a
whole body of writing, some
pieces of which may be loosely
connected to others, hanging
only by a thread, but always a
preface.
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[the wind] produced a
kind of insanity in my
spirits that burst all
bounds of reason and
reflection. I lighted the
dry branch of a tree
and danced with fury
around the devoted
cottage … with a loud
scream I fired the straw,
and heath, and bushes,
which I had collected.
The wind fanned the
fire, and the cottage

a malformed and unviable being
passed through her own body
without organs.
Within the writing of
Frankenstein, we cannot discount
others who may assemble and
connect to Shelley’s writing
machine. Deleuze and Guattari
(1987) open one of their works
by stating “The two of us wrote
Anti-Oedipus together. Since
each of us was several, there
was already quite a crowd”
(p. 3). Is there any doubt that
Shelley could have said the
same? According to Badalamenti
(2006), one of the

monster, there is no process for
the spread of ideas in this way
because, like the monster, ideas
are uncontrollable. Thought
exists “in a smooth space that it
must occupy without counting,
and for which there is no
possible method, no conceivable
reproduction, but only relays,
intermezzos, resurgences”
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987,
p. 377). Thoughts—texts—
encounter readers and form
a literary machines, having
various effects on those readers
that the author of the text cannot
control. Here, we

In some ways, I wonder if the
Frankenmonster is the best
analogy for writing. Instead,
it is as though I have a kraken
with hundreds of tentacles
inside me; at various points, a
tentacle reaches out, comprising
a piece of writing; the tentacles
themselves are lines of flight,
various manifestations of
thought that all connect in
some form. We can follow the
tentacles back to their origin
points only to discover that
they connect to other tentacles,
twisting around one another,
forming linkages
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was quickly enveloped
by the flames (Shelley,
p. 165-166).
The monster, despite his
attempts, has not been able to
join the world that would seek to
place Oedipal barriers of social
and psychic repression. Anything
but autistic, the monster becomes
animal, a howling wolfman,
a dancing, fire-producing
Neanderthal, a monster in its
darkest connotations of the term:
open to intensities of experience,
beyond the reaches of rational
language, not bound at all by
reason or

strongest influences on the
novel was Mary Shelley’s
husband Percy who, upon
Mary’s completion of the work,
reviewed the novel, revising
it at points and explicitly
contributed his own voice to
the story by writing the preface.
Shelley admits to the infiltration
of Percy influence into the body
of the novel in the author’s
introduction written to append
to the revision of the work she
released in 1831. At the time of
this publication, Shelley wrote
that the “several pages” of the
original work

begin to think about what a real
post-process theory might look
like. A text, a paper, a thought
constantly evolves, constantly
emerges. This flies in the face
of more traditional rhetoric and
writing wisdom: the canons
of Cicero, the conventions of
genre, signposts designed to
lead readers down a particular
path. What does writing look
like when we think of our readers as bodies without organs, 0
intensities, forming a literary
machine with our writing?

and overlaps and knots. Then
again, the kraken is its own kind
of Frankenmonster, assembled
over hundreds of years of
folklore, borrowing from
various cultures’ superstitions
about water monsters.
Whether it be a kraken
or Frankenstein, or vampire,
or ghost that haunts, calling
writing a monster is accurate
because part of the allure of
a monster is that it cannot be
controlled. These creatures are
notoriously difficult to locate
and rid oneself of, and that is
certainly
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reflection. He is the schizophrenic
visibly resisting Oedipalization
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 52),
the ‘rational’ being that caves into
absolute irrationality as he burns
the very symbol of the traditional,
daddy-mommy-me triangle—the
pastoral, domestic cottage.
Still, we Oedipalize; we
see in the Frankenstein films
a kind of accounting for the
monster: sexualizing it with
eels and probes, identifying
the spark of life with
observable lightening. The
same is true in the novel; there

reflected “many a walk,
many a drive, and many a
conversation when [she] was
not alone” (Shelley, 2017, p.
300). She further alludes to her
“companion,” indicating that
she will see this person “no
more” (Shelley, 2017, p. 300).
Here, it is not necessarily the
intensities of grief or trauma
that spur the text, but another
individual, triangulated into
being by his own multiplicities,
his own intensities, that further
contributes to the work. Indeed,
some of the key aspects of
Frankenstein,

While compositionists,
those responsible for a postprocess movement, seem
to have largely ignored this
question, we find many
examples of Deleuzian writing
theory in qualitative research.
Wyatt, Gale, Gannon, and
Davies (2011), for instance,
explore how individuated
co-authors blur and overlap,
bringing various intensities to
one another, indelibly shaping
one another’s thoughts as they
wrote together: “instead of
exploring Deleuze as an abstract
set of propositions, we

the case with the thoughts that
produce writing, at least within
me. I would describe some of
my most intense moments of
writing as flow, when I become
unaware of the world around
me, fully enveloped in putting
words to paper. In this case,
the thoughts behind writing
possess me. I can’t not write.
Or if I refuse, something will
seem off; I become hyperactive,
squirmy, unable to concentrate
on some other task until the idea
is fleshed in writing. And how
interesting that it must be
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is a need to control the monster
via the narrative of its life,
accounting for his thoughts
and actions. At the end of the
novel, Victor identifies the
monster, before anything else,
as “rational” (Shelley, 1818, p.
269). These words fly in the face
of the above passage, wherein
the monster allows himself to
be moved by sensation and
intensity, those affects that
inscribe themselves upon his
body without organs, an act of
anti-rationality, pure intensity

including names of the
character, came directly from
Percy’s experience, rather than
Shelley’s head.
It is also difficult to read
Frankenstein without also
considering the immediate
connections of Mary and Percy
Shelley to their Romantic
contemporaries. Along with
providing Mary Shelley a place
into which she could explore
the complicated web of her
relationships, the novel also
provided her with an inlet to
explore and problematize the
way

brought his concepts to life in
our collaborating bodies and
our unfolding engagements with
life in its specificity—and in its
Being. We sought to unleash
the creative voice of matter
in our engagement in [our]
assemblage” (Wyatt et al., 2014,
p. 409). Guttorm (2012), reacting
to Wyatt et al. (2011), writes
about how a paper is never quite
under her control—ideas shift
and evolve, and she reflects upon
this experience using poetic
language. The poetic language,
she states, is designed to open a
stream that flows

fleshed out—part of the
hideousness of the Frankenstein
monster was the fact that it
was not fully fleshed. Its skin
could barely contain itself; this
appearance created a negative
response in those that beheld it.
As Victor created his
monster, he seemed to be in a
similar state of flow. He lost
track of time, he disappeared
from his friends, he stopped
eating. He too was fully
enveloped in his composition,
fleshing out the body of work
that he saw as his. And yet, it
was not until he
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And this is the nature
of Oedipus: “a fantastic
repression” (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1983, p. 3), one which
seeks to create an arborescent
singularity in place of the
rhizomatic multiplicity of the
monster (Heymans, 2011). By
the monster’s account, it was,
after all, his exposure to the
cruelty exacted upon him by
the humans he encountered
that made him the villain his
creator believed him to be.
The monster’s linear, narrative
account is a shame and a

that many of her contemporaries,
including her husband, placed
excessive faith in “science to
answer questions about life
and nature, expecting scientists
to articulate a consistent
worldview that would help
people understand the vast world
around them” (Hogsette, 2011, p.
534). Along with this reliance on
science to explain the mysteries
of the world, proponents of
the Enlightenment, such as
Kant, believed that human
maturity occurred only when an
individual abandoned the need to
rely on

from those authors that she has
read and that have inspired her
thinking—she is an example
of the reader as body without
organs, being called to action
by a text. Her call to action is
a revolution of thoughts. More
recently, a book was released
that examines how we might
use Deleuze to write in the
academy and create monsters
from our writing (Riddle, Bright
& Honan, 2018). It is strange
that so few compositionists
seem to have employed Deleuze
and Guattari within their works;
these

had produced his body that he
realized what he had created,
beheld the ugliness that he
then allowed to wreak havoc
across the world. Though it was
months before any sign of the
creature would appear again, it
was always in the back of his
mind, filling him with sickness
and anxiety. What better way
to describe the process of
submitting or sharing a paper
and waiting for a reader to
respond? At the grade school or
high school level, we write an
essay and await criticism from
the teacher. On
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testament to the Oedipalizing
repression that Victor, as well as
the DeLaceys, the villagers that
attack him, and the individual
who shot him, force the monster
into. The monster is a body
without organs manifest and a
phenomenon of bordering; it is
this image of wildness which
creates horror in others as well
as a desire to tame and control.
The monster’s becoming animal
places it into an unrecognizable
species (Carretero-Gonzalez,
2016), and it is not allowed to
operate within a

another’s intelligence instead of
their own. According to Kant,
enlightenment required only
freedom, and an individual
gained that freedom when they
sought to “walk alone” even at
the risk of failure (Kant, 1784,
p. 1). For Shelley, the monster
is the embodiment of the
Enlightenment’s focus on the
pursuit of scientific knowledge
turned monstrous, without any
thought to moral responsibility
(Hogsette, 2011). Though
mentors and teachers such as the
repugnantly described

pieces, largely written by
qualitative researchers, might
offer an excellent place to begin.
But to our original question,
what does a Deleuzian approach
to post-process writing look
like? And how might we employ
this pedagogically? Pedagogy
has been a bugbear of the postprocess movement (Kent, 1999;
Heard, 2008, Mays 2017). How
to make something non-processoriented, non-methodological,
teachable? Deleuze suggested
that we adopt an

Facebook, a post is submitted,
and we wait to see how others
will like it. Perhaps the stakes
are lower than releasing a
zombie into the world, but
the waiting is the same; we
anticipate how others will
respond to our writing, we wait
for the criticism or the feedback,
and we dread the mistakes and
errors that we have made, which
only seem to make themselves
apparent after we have finished
our toils. We have no control
over our writing at that point;
we were simply the toiling force
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space reserved for those that
are recognizable. For one
that is driven by passions and
intensities, one that has no
Oedipal beginnings, no physical
coherence, there is no world to
live in. The creature must live
among borders and margins,
and there is no end but to exile
oneself and, perhaps, die.
What might we take away
from all of this? Alkon (2002)
suggests that “the role of
science in Frankenstein, as in
so much subsequent science
fiction, is not so much to

Krempe discourage Victor’s
interests in alchemy, Victor
fuses alchemy with the science
of enlightenment and creates
an abomination. Along with
the monster representing Mary
Shelley’s warning of how
Enlightenment results in the
practice of science without the
temperance of morality, Mary
Shelley also uses Frankenstein
to critique the Age of
Enlightenment’s pursuit of human
perfection (Cook, 2019). In the
novel, one of the reasons that
Victor pursues the creation of

attitude of transcendental
empiricism (St. Pierre, 2016);
in line with his concepts of
difference and the virtual,
he suggested that we break
with claims about what is in
the world. An author cannot,
with certainty, determine the
ways that audience will react
to a piece of writing. Instead,
we should focus on what has
the potential to emerge (from
writing). Nietzsche’s writing
was taken up by the Nazi
cause, used by the monster that
was Adolph Hitler, although
Nietzsche could never have

that brought the piece of text
into existence (and even then,
how much credit can we actually
take? We had no control over the
desires that manifest to drive us
to put pen to paper). The piece
itself, then, disseminates its
own ideas as others come into
contact with it. It is no longer
an author-text machine, but a
reader-text machine. Perhaps it
will be received well, but there
is always risk.
This leads to some
interesting questions which I
am not ready to answer. For
instance, from a
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consider scientific realities
as to afford a unique vantage
point for contemplation of the
human condition” (p. 5). Could
this human condition be one of
scientization as criticized by
Deleuze and Guattari (1983;
1987) and Massumi (2002)?
The free, detached, a-multiple
rationality of Kantian (1784)
enlightenment? Certainly
it is science that creates the
condition of the monster, a
condition which may then be
reviled as horrific and irrational.
Perhaps Shelley (1818) herself,
a close associate of the

his creature is that he wishes
to create a perfect human
being that can defeat death.
The monster then becomes a
product and portent of efforts
to achieve human perfection
outside of the confines of the
mentorship of morality; he also
becomes Shelley’s critique of
the Enlightenment’s drive for
a freedom of discovery that
rejects any sort of morality and
instead relies solely on science
in the pursuit of knowledge.
However, what we may learn
from this is that ideas do not
spontaneously emerge

anticipated this (Higgins
& Solomon, 2000). Joyce
acknowledged that his readers
would add more to his writing,
constantly guessing at its
meaning, filling in blanks,
theorizing, but never entirely
aware of how his work might
inspire others—only that it
would inspire (Ellmann, 1982).
In this, there is a potential lesson
to engender within students if
one is to take seriously a postprocess pedagogy. That the
effects and affects of writing
will always be uncertain—that
we can imbue as much

Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective,
how responsible is the author
for their piece of writing? If an
author is simply overcome with
intensities and must produce,
then we cannot blame the author
for what is written (should we
blame Victor for his creation?).
And if the text takes on its own
life as it comes into contact with
readers, we certainly cannot
blame the author for the way
that the text is taken up. And
yet, I feel that there is a weight
as I write, a need to make sure I
express an
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Satanic poets, was making
a case for the wandering
schizoid, criticizing the over
determination that was present
in the sciences even in the early
1800s.

within authors’ minds to be
written. We might say, rather,
that ideas are inscribed within
an author; they use the author,
rather than the author uses them,
insisting that the author write
them. Ideas are negotiated,
and they rewrite themselves
as they come into contact with
other ideas, as others attach
themselves to the writing
assemblage of author-ideacontext-infinity.

meaning into a text as we
may want, but it will always
escape us as others come into
contact with it. But from a
transcendentally empirical
perspective, this is appropriate.
Writing is not necessarily
meaningful, but generative.
Rather than a post-process
pedagogy, we must ask: how do
we teach generativity, creativity,
works that inspire internal
and external revolutions while
erasing ourselves and static
notions of what writing needs to
be from the conversation?

idea clearly, try to bridge my
mind with my audience’s,
although I do not know who
will actually be reading my
work. This is perhaps a neurosis
on my end, one brought about
by years of believing that I have
some control. I wonder what a
different approach to teaching
writing might look like, one that
allows us to think of our textual
creations as creatures that we
instill with life that will then, on
their own accord, leave us and
produce their own meaning.

Joshua Cruz & Holly Corkill
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